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This Policy Series by James Salzman brings attention to a rapidly 
developing phenomenon—payments for ecosystem services (PES). 
Salzman, the Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law and the Nicho-
las Institute Professor of Environmental Policy at Duke University, 
explains when and where ecosystem services can be provided by 
voluntary markets rather than government actions.
The key to understanding how PES work is rooted in the basis 
of any voluntary market transaction—gains from trade. One party 
agrees to take action because another party offers an incentive. 
Both parties benefit. A beekeeper, for example, brings her hives to 
an orchard to provide pollination services for a fee. But Salzman 
explores the less obvious services such as forests at the top of 
a municipal watershed that act as a filter providing clean water to 
people below.
Salzman states that we receive many environmental benefits for 
“free,” which provides little or no incentive for people to pay for them 
or for entrepreneurs to provide them. Because price signals that alert 
individuals about scarce resources in traditional markets are absent, 
ecosystem services are taken for granted—until they stop providing 
benefits. Then the cost of remediation or building infrastructure, such 
as a water treatment plant, makes their value obvious.
For decades the solution to environmental protection has been 
government action. Today, knowledge about environmental pro-
cesses combined with increased environmental sensitivity provides 
opportunities for entrepreneurs to find innovative ways of developing 
markets for ecosystem services.  
This publication is part of the PERC Policy Series of papers on 
timely environmental topics. This issue was edited by Roger Meiners 
and Laura Huggins and was designed by Mandy-Scott Bachelier. We 
are grateful to the M.J. Murdock Charitable Trust for their support 
of this project.
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What aRE ECosystEm sERviCEs?
When visiting a store, one expects to find useful goods and 
services such as apples to eat and the refrigerators that keep them 
chilled. We depend on similar goods and services in our everyday 
lives. Indeed, we take them for granted. Nature also provides us 
valuable goods and services, and we take many of those for granted 
as well. When we bite into a juicy apple, if we pause to think beyond 
the store where it was purchased, we may think of soil and water, 
but probably not the natural pollinators that fertilized the apple blos-
som so the fruit can set. When we drink a cool glass of tap water, 
we may think of the local reservoir, but not the source of the water 
quality, which lies miles upstream in the wooded watershed that 
filters and cleans the water as it flows downhill. 
Largely taken for granted, healthy ecosystems provide a variety 
of critical goods and services. Created by the interactions of living 
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organisms with their environment, “ecosystem services” supply 
both the conditions and processes that sustain human life. Trees 
provide timber; coastal marshes provide shellfish. That’s obvious. 
The services underpinning these goods, though less visible, are 
equally important. If you doubt this, consider how to grow an apple 
without pollination, pest control, or soil fertility.
A specific landscape offers a range of ecosystem services. A 
forest at the top of a watershed, for example, provides water quality 
by filtering contaminants from the water as it flows through roots 
and soil, flood control as the water slows while moving through the 
watershed, pollination by those pollinators living along the edge of 
the forest, and biodiversity conservation if endangered plants or 
animals live in the woods. Or consider something as simple as soil. 
More than a clump of dirt, soil is a complex matrix of organic and 
inorganic constituents transformed by numerous tiny organisms. 
The level of biological activity within soil is staggering. Under a 
square meter of pasture soil in Denmark, for example, scientists 
identified more than 50,000 worms, 48,000 small insects, and 
10 million nematodes. This living soil provides a range of critical 
ecosystem services: buffering and moderation of the hydrological 
cycle, physical support for plants, retention and delivery of nutrients 
to plants, disposal of wastes and dead organic matter, and renewal 
of soil fertility (Daily 1997).
While one can categorize ecosystem services any number 
of ways, the most common approach is that employed by the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). It divided services 
into four categories:
1.  provisioning services (the products obtained from 
ecosystems—food, fiber, fresh water);
2.  regulating services (the benefits obtained from the 
regulation of ecosystem processes—pest control, water 
purification, erosion control, carbon sequestration);
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3.  cultural services (the nonmaterial benefits that people obtain 
from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive 
development, recreation, and aesthetic experiences);
4.  supporting services needed to maintain other services (soil 
formation, photosynthesis).
Ecosystem services are provided and enjoyed across a range 
of scales. Pollination and renewal of soil fertility are local services. 
Climate stabilization and genetic resources are generated locally 
(through carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation) but 
enjoyed globally. Thus, depending on the service, a wide range of 
landscapes can be important service providers, from pristine, intact 
ecosystems such as natural forests, wetlands, and estuaries, to 
human-dominated landscapes such as agricultural lands.
Just as we tend not to think about everyday goods and services 
until the store is out of apples or the refrigerator stops working, so 
too, do we generally fail to appreciate the importance of ecosys-
tem services until we suffer the impacts of their loss. One cannot 
easily appreciate the impact that widespread wetland destruction 
has had on the ecosystem service of water retention until after a 
flood. Nor does one fully appreciate water quality until recogniz-
ing how development in forested watersheds has degraded the 
service of water purification. The costs from degradation of these 
services are high and are suffered in rich and poor countries alike 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). In short, ecosystem services are 
critical to our well-being.
Economic Value of Ecosystem Services
Awareness of ecosystem services’ importance is not new. Plato 
wrote about the service of soil retention more than 2,500 years ago 
(Daily 1997). But efforts to identify and calculate these services’ 
valuable contributions are surprisingly recent. Research demon-
strates the high costs of replacing such services if they fail. Con-
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sider a specific service, such as soil providing nitrogen to plants. 
Nitrogen is naturally supplied to plants through both nitrogen fixing 
organisms and the recycling of nutrients in the soil. If nitrogen were 
provided by commercial fertilizers rather than natural processes, 
the lowest cost estimate for crops in the United States would be 
$45 billion, and the figure for all land plants would be $320 billion 
(Daily 1997). Such estimates are inherently uncertain, of course, 
but the extraordinary costs required to substitute for such services 
by artificial means are clear.
While the estimated dollar value of these services is impres-
sive, these estimates have significant limitations. First, because 
most ecosystem services are not exchanged in robust markets 
(such as buying apples), there are no obvious prices to calculate 
their values. Economists have different ways to measure their 
economic value, all of which require extrapolation or assumptions. 
For example, a wetland ecosystem may be characterized either 
through its features (site-specific characteristics such as landscape 
context, vegetation type, salinity), goods (vegetation, mollusks, 
fish), services (nutrient cycling, water retention), or amenities 
(recreation, bird-watching).
These goods, services, and amenities can be divided into sepa-
rate categories. The most obvious includes consumable goods such 
as cranberries and crabs that are exchanged in markets and easily 
priced (direct market uses). Activities such as hiking and fishing 
(direct nonmarket uses) as well as more intangible existence and 
option values (nonmarket, nonuse) are generally not exchanged 
in markets. As a result, their values must be determined indirectly. 
Many ecosystem services are categorized as indirect nonmarket 
uses, for while they provide clear benefits to humans, they are 
neither directly “consumed” nor exchanged in markets (Barbier, 
Acreman, and Knowler 1997).
The second challenge is that an ecosystem service’s value is 
landscape-specific. The benefit to humans is not a straightforward 
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biophysical measure, identical ecosystems in different locations 
will have very different values. The value of a wetland’s nutrient 
trapping service, for instance, depends on the location of its out-
flow. Does it flow to shellfish beds (high value) or to a fast-flowing 
ocean current (low value)?
Third, policy makers must concern themselves with two dif-
ferent types of valuation. The first is the absolute value of the 
ecosystem service. Methods to determine this have been noted 
above. These values may prove important for political or advocacy 
purposes. Knowing that wetlands provide billions of dollars of 
services to local communities may make it easier to adopt regula-
tions or other protective measures for wetlands. The second type 
of measure is marginal value. The fact that pollinators annually 
provide Americans up to $1.6 billion of service or that soil fertility 
is worth $45 billion is important to know for general policy direc-
tion, but it does not help to inform specific land use or pollution 
permitting decisions. One cannot divide the $45 billion value of 
soil fertility by the nation’s total agricultural acreage to determine 
the value of the services on five acres of land threatened by a 
specific development. Land use decisions are made on the mar-
gins, for example, whether to allow development of 10 hectares 
in a 70-hectare wetland. Thus, the greatest need for ecosystem 
service valuation may be at the margins, determining how much 
service provision is worth in this particular location.
Fourth, often times we do not need to know the absolute 
value of a service, so long as it is obviously important. In deciding 
whether or not to invest in an ecosystem service or a technological 
service provider, the key question is relative cost. If it costs $10 
million to build a treatment plant and $5 million to institute land-
use changes with the same resulting improvement in water quality, 
then investing in an ecosystem service makes financial sense. 
That is, valuing the costs of substitutes may be more important 
than valuing the absolute service. 
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In sum, ecosystem services make critically important contribu-
tions to human welfare and valuation can make this clear. Marginal 
valuation will generally provide the most useful guide to decisions 
as such services are brought into markets.
Why Are Ecosystem Services Underprotected?
Despite their central role in provision of important benefits, 
ecosystem services are rarely protected by the law (Salzman 
1997). Nor, in the past, have significant markets arisen that 
capitalize the commercial value of these services. The reason 
for this relative neglect is threefold: ignorance, institutions, and 
immature markets.
Ignorance
Perhaps the most basic reason we do not pay more attention to 
the provision of ecosystem services is that we take them for granted. 
We are often ignorant of the sources of goods and services we 
depend on. To efficiently provide services, at a minimum we must 
be able to identify services on a local ecological scale—detailing 
how they are generated and how they are delivered. We can make 
empirically sound predictions that actions on a gross scale, such 
as clear-cutting, will affect nutrient flows and services or that a sig-
nificant loss of animal and plant populations will reduce ecosystem 
resiliency. In the aggregate, improved knowledge provides better 
guidance in warning against destructive practices. But landscape 
context matters. In most cases, our scientific knowledge is still in-
adequate to undertake meaningful marginal analysis. For example, 
it is difficult to predict how developing 30 percent of this wetland will 
impact water quality, flooding events, or local bird populations.
Institutions
A second obstacle to the protection of services is institutional. 
Political jurisdictions are rarely aligned with ecologically significant 
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areas such as watersheds; instead, they exercise authority over ar-
eas defined by state, provincial, or municipal borders. Environmen-
tal problems do not track political boundaries, and it is difficult for 
multiple political actors to agree on a constructive course of action. 
Even more challenging, the costs and benefits of conserving eco-
system services may be separated across jurisdictions. Thus, for 
example, upstream and downstream jurisdictions will have very dif-
ferent views about the value of upstream forest conservation when 
it comes to water quality. As a result, consistent efforts to manage 
landscapes to ensure service provision are easily confounded by 
political action problems. Additionally, while private property in the 
United States and some other nations tends to have strong protec-
tion against invasion, this is not true in much of the world, where 
the ability of a land possessor to protect property is weak.
Immature Markets
While some ecosystem services are clearly valuable to the 
general welfare, they may have little or even no current market 
value. We have no shortage of markets for many ecosystem goods 
(such as apples or fish). People pay money for apples every day at 
the grocery store without a second’s thought. But the ecosystem 
services underpinning these goods are often treated as if they are 
free. This does not mean that they have no value. Rather, services 
may have no market value for the simple reason that no markets 
exist in which they can be bought or sold. As a result, there are no 
direct price mechanisms to signal the scarcity or degradation until 
they fail, at which point their nonmarket value becomes obvious be-
cause of the costs to restore or replace them (Heal et al. 2001). 
Many ecosystem services are often described as “public goods.” 
This is a term economists use to describe a good that is nonrival 
(consumption of the good by one does not reduce the amount left 
for others) and non-excludable (individuals cannot be excluded 
from consuming the good). Unlike an apple that can be bought 
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and consumed by one person, all those who live in a country with 
secure borders and low crime rates benefit from these public goods, 
whether they pay taxes or not. Similarly, those who live downstream 
from wetlands benefit from the role wetlands play in slowing flood-
waters, whether they paid to conserve the wetlands or not. 
In fact, many ecosystem services, ranging from flood control 
to climate stability, provide nonrival and non-excludable benefits. 
Because these services have no market price, they appear to be 
free and, as a result, are taken for granted (until their importance 
is recognized after their loss). 
Take the example of wetlands and their role as a nursery for 
young fish. The wetland’s owner provides a benefit to anglers and 
those who like to eat fish by providing habitat for fish to grow and 
reach maturity. But these benefits are uncompensated. The mar-
ket value of the wetlands depends on its location, the pressure for 
coastal development, and the scarcity of alternative development 
sites. The benefits it provides simply are not part of the current 
calculation. If the wetland is developed, the nursery benefits will 
be lost. There are no market signals to suggest they should be 
considered in the transaction. Because we can easily value eco-
system goods such as timber or fish, we tend to invest in extracting 
these goods even if it means degrading certain services related 
to their production.
These are not isolated examples. Because landowners gener-
ally are not paid for the services their land provides to others, it 
should come as no surprise that they see few incentives to conserve 
or enhance the uncompensated services they generate, nor are 
there obvious reasons why they should take service provision into 
account when making land-use decisions. The landowners’ focus 
will be on the current maximum net value of the alternative uses 
of the land (Farrier 1995). 
Ignorance and public goods—barriers to market creation—
are related. Markets create knowledge. We have advanced un-
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derstanding of how to manage farmland to maximize production 
of cash crops for the simple reason that they are cash crops. it 
pays to manage land efficiently for crop production. We have a 
much poorer understanding of how to manage land for ecosystem 
service provision, not because these services have no value but 
because landowners cannot capture the value of the services their 
landscape provides. Agricultural markets provide clear signals to 
farmers of the value of clearing wetlands to grow more crops; but 
there are few markets for biodiversity, water quality, or flood control 
to reflect the loss in benefits once the land is cleared.
Why Choose Payments?
Consider the example of water quality. Imagine that a municipal 
water supplier owns the upland forest, which naturally filters and 
cleans water as it flows through the upper watershed. Property own-
ers in the farmlands are dairy farmers, grazing cows on their fields 
beside the stream that flows into the reservoir. The farmers could 
manage their land to provide an improved service of water purification 
by planting riparian vegetation buffers (e.g., erecting fences to protect 
plants alongside the stream from grazing). Such vegetative buffers 
capture nutrients and provide the ecosystem service of reducing silt 
before it reaches the watercourse. Downstream water consumers 
benefit from these actions, which provide clean drinking water that 
does not require extensive pre-treatment. Farmers might benefit 
from reduced stream bank erosion (see Box 1, page 10).
Traditionally, few landowners would plant riparian buffers. 
Farmers may have been informed of the benefits of this practice 
for themselves and for downstream users, but it is unlikely that 
they would change their behavior due to the time and cost of fenc-
ing and the concerns over the loss of productivity from setting 
aside pasture. Those who fenced off their streams would bear 
all the costs, with no contributions from those downstream who 
benefit from the cleaner water.
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So how could the downstream users ensure clean drinking 
water? One might rely on engineering and build a pretreat-
ment plant. An ecosystem service approach of riparian buffers, 
however, may be less expensive. The traditional governmental 
approach would likely impose prescriptive regulations to require 
farmers to plant riparian buffers. One could equally rely on finan-
cial penalties, levying a tax on farmers who do not have buffers, 
or trying to persuade farmers to put in buffers. These are set out 
in Box 2, page 11. 
One could, however, view the issue from a different perspective. 
Why not simply recognize this situation for what it is—the provision 
of valuable services to consumers—and realize this through an 
Box 1: A Model Watershed
Credit: © Sarah B. Lauterbach, reprinted with permission from River Network, www.rivernetwork.org.
Upland Forest
Farmlands
reservoir
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explicit arrangement of payments for services rendered? Why not 
treat farmers’ provision of ecosystem services as no different from 
their provision of other marketable goods? Farmers are accustomed 
to contractual arrangements for their agricultural products. Dairy 
farmers sign contracts to sell their milk; potato farmers do the same. 
Water filtration services may also be treated as a business transac-
tion, where farmers manage their land through riparian buffers and 
grass swales to “grow the crop of water quality” much the same as 
dairy and potato farmers do for their cash crops.
In many respects, the provision of ecosystem services would 
be no different than supplying traditional farm produce, with the 
level of compensation dependent on the quality and level of ser-
Prescription
Property rights
Penalty
Persuasion
Payment
Box 2: Environmental Policy Toolkit in a Watershed
Institute regulations requiring riparian buffers
Combine regulations with tradable right of buffers
Tax farmers who do not have buffers
Demonstrate the benefits of buffers with pilot projects
Pay for planting of buffers
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vices provided. Such exchanges would be arm’s-length payments 
for services rendered, creating an incentive for the landholder to 
manage the property so that service provision is ensured. The 
concept behind payments for ecosystem services (PES) is simple 
and is set out in Box 3, below. Through this perspective, environ-
mental protection can more closely resemble contracts between 
service providers and service beneficiaries than the object of 
governmental regulations.
Box 3: The PES Concept
The environment provides critically important services. Some of these are 
captured by markets, but many are not. They are environmental benefits that 
may currently be received for nothing and so regarded as “free.” As a result, 
many ecosystem services tend to be both underconserved and undervalued. If 
beneficiaries had to pay for explicit service provision, however, property owners 
would think differently about sustainable land management practices. Payments 
for ecosystem services seek to “get the incentives right” by capturing the ben-
efits as well as by providing accurate signals to service providers and users that 
reflect the value that ecosystem services deliver.1
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The first insight of an ecosystem services perspective is that 
investing in natural capital can prove more efficient than using built 
capital to deliver key services. As an example, consider the case 
of flood control. One can address floodwaters through built capital, 
such as engineered works (e.g., construction and maintenance of 
dikes and levees) or through natural capital, such as landscape 
management (e.g., restoration of wetlands in flood plains). In some 
instances, landscape management may prove a better public and 
private investment strategy for providing flood control once one 
accounts for the many benefits of improved water quality, wildlife 
habitat, and recreational amenities (see Box 4, page 14).
Payments for ecosystem services refer to voluntary transac-
tions where a service provider is paid by or on behalf of service 
beneficiaries for land, coastal, or marine management practices 
that are expected to result in continued or improved service provi-
sion. The payment may be monetary or barter and is intended to 
defray or compensate the costs of service provision. PES can in-
clude many different types of parties—from farmers, communities, 
and taxpayers to consumers and corporations. PES schemes can 
occur over very different scales—from pollination of local farms to 
“shade-grown” coffee beans that are sold half a world from where 
they are grown. PES also spans a wide range of transaction types, 
from one-off payments for a biodiversity offset to arm’s-length 
market transactions for carbon credits.
Consider how a PES can emerge. There is no doubt that land-
owners know their property better than the service beneficiaries 
do. Landholders know the opportunity cost of a specific land-use 
change and can determine the price they are willing to accept to 
implement a change. For its part, the beneficiary knows how much 
it is willing to pay and, in some cases (particularly when the gov-
ernment is the purchaser) which types of land-use changes would 
be most valuable for service provision. The PES design challenge 
is how most efficiently to transfer both types of information—(1) 
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Box 4: new York City Investing in natural Capital
In the early 1990s, a combination of federal regulation and cost realities 
drove New York City to reconsider its water supply strategy. New York City’s 
water system provides about 1.2 billion gallons of drinking water to almost nine 
million New Yorkers every day. Ninety percent of the water is drawn from the 
Catskill/Delaware watershed, which extends 125 miles north and west of the city. 
Under amendments to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, municipal and other 
water suppliers were required to filter their surface water supplies unless they 
could demonstrate that they had taken other steps, including watershed protec-
tion measures, to protect their customers from harmful water contamination.
Presented with a choice between provision of clean water through building 
a filtration plant or managing the watershed, New York City managers concluded 
that an ecosystem services approach was more cost effective. It was estimated 
that a filtration plant would cost between $6 and $8 billion to build. By contrast, 
watershed protection efforts, which would include not only the acquisition of 
critical watershed lands but also a variety of other programs designed to reduce 
contamination sources in the watershed, would cost only about $1.5 billion. 
Through a stakeholder consultation process, after two years and more than 150 
meetings, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by 60 towns, 10 villages, 
seven counties, and various environmental groups. Acting on behalf of the 
beneficiaries of the Catskills’ water purification services, New York City chose to 
invest in natural rather than built capital.
Source: Daily and Ellison (2002).
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willingness to pay/accept, and (2) service provision resulting from 
a land use change—from one party to another in a mutually rein-
forcing fashion.
Prescriptive measures are inefficient at information exchange 
for the simple reason that they are primarily a one-way discus-
sion—the government telling regulated parties what they can or 
cannot do. The farmer’s knowledge of which land-use changes 
are least costly is ignored. Financial penalties suffer the same 
shortcoming. It falls entirely on the government to determine not 
only which actions to encourage or discourage, but also how much 
financial penalty is needed to induce the appropriate behavior. 
At their core, markets are an exchange of information about 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept. The market mechanism 
necessitates that each side reveal information to the other. Indeed, if 
set up carefully, payment schemes can shift the information burden 
to the landowners.
While the principle of PES is simply stated—those who benefit 
from service provision should pay the providers—this is far easier 
said than done, for the equally simple reason that ecosystem 
services are taken for granted. Because it is difficult to prevent 
someone who did not pay for an ecosystem service from benefiting 
from it, it is equally difficult to get people to volunteer now to pay 
for provision of these services. Why pay for something when you 
have always gotten it for free? As a result, a key challenge in a PES 
lies in creating a market that may not now exist—in capturing the 
value of the service by compensating the providers for the services 
they provide. This approach views environmental protection much 
as a business transaction between willing parties.
When successful, PES creates positive economic incentives 
for landowners to conserve or improve the function of their lands 
for a variety of ecosystem services. In the process, PES may bring 
new resources and new incentives to conservation, a particularly 
important development when funding for conservation is scarce.
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Types of Services Receiving Payments
As noted before, there is a broad range of ecosystem services. 
Not all of these, however, are amenable to PES. If one looks at 
the PES schemes operating or in pilot phases, payments cluster 
around four broad types of services.
The first is watershed protection. This includes the ecosystem 
services of water purification, ensuring water quantity, flood control, 
erosion control, and others. In general, downstream beneficiaries 
pay upstream landowners either for adopting particular land uses 
or maintaining current land uses. Payments for water services 
benefit from the advantage that it is relatively easy to identify both 
the providers and the users of these services and, equally impor-
tant, the users are generally discrete (e.g., private operations such 
as hydroelectric facilities and industrial users) or institutions that 
represent groups of users such as municipal water authorities (who 
act on behalf of the public) or irrigation districts (who act on behalf 
of the irrigation farmers). All of these parties have an obvious and 
direct interest in service provision. Moreover, the beneficiaries, par-
ticularly water users, are accustomed to paying for water already. 
Indeed, water services are the most common PES (Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002).
The second type of service is carbon sequestration. Depend-
ing on how the climate negotiations conclude, the sequestration 
of carbon by reforestation and land use may come to dominate 
other PES schemes in total value. The classic example of such 
a PES scheme is a large emitter of carbon dioxide in a country 
that regulates greenhouse gas emissions paying a landowner to 
plant additional trees. In exchange for the additional carbon now 
sequestered, the company obtains credits it can use to offset its 
greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to watershed services, car-
bon sequestration can operate at the regional, national, or global 
scale, though the trend seems to be increasingly toward national 
and global markets.
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The third service receiving payments is biodiversity conserva-
tion. Because biodiversity is a classic public good, the PES here 
are smaller and more discrete. While there are isolated examples 
of species habitat banks, biodiversity payments can take a wide 
range of forms, including purchase of conservation easements, 
payment for bioprospecting rights or research permits, hunting and 
fishing licenses, and leasing water for instream flows to protect 
fish (Scarborough and Lund 2007). Not surprisingly, most of these 
payments operate at the local or regional level.
The last service category is landscape amenities. The most 
obvious example is ecotourism, where tourism operators pay lo-
cal landowners or communities to not hunt in certain areas or to 
engage in particular land management activities. This approach 
has run into the criticism that few meaningful payments from 
ecotourism actually end up in the hands of locals. Nonetheless, 
as development pressures increase, the value of natural places 
will increase, raising the potential for greater revenue flows to-
ward ecotourism. 
DEsigning PaymEnts foR 
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Five basic questions must be considered in PES transactions 
(see Box 5, page 18). The first concerns what specific service 
needs to be provided and whether landscape management can 
provide this service. The second question focuses on the providers 
and beneficiaries. Unless the sellers and buyers of these services 
are discrete, then PES will be very difficult. The third question ad-
dresses the level of service that needs to be provided and whether 
this can be adequately monitored. If the linkage between land-
scape management and service provision is poorly understood, 
then the buyer will have little confidence he is receiving value for 
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his payments. The fourth question asks which type of payment 
mechanism is most appropriate. This will depend on a range of 
factors, starting with the nature of the service, the scale of service 
provision, the buyers, and the sellers. The fifth question asks if 
key institutions, such as the law and the courts, are sufficient to 
help enforce PES. 
Box 5: Key PES Design Questions
1. What is the service being provided and can landscape management 
efficiently provide the service?
2. Who provides the service and who benefits? Are there discrete groups of 
providers and beneficiaries?
3. What level of service is needed and can this be adequately monitored?
4. What is the most effective payment mechanism: direct payment, 
mitigation and offsets, or certification?
5. Are the supporting institutions adequate?
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What is the Service Being Provided?
In crafting payments to ensure ecosystem service provision, 
one first considers which service matters or whether the problem 
to be addressed can effectively be handled by land management. If 
land management either cannot provide adequate service provision 
or cannot do so cost-effectively, then PES may prove ineffective.
This seems easy to determine in the case of local biodiversity, 
as it is best provided through conservation of remnant native habi-
tat. If the problem is erosion, the ecosystem service of soil retention 
can be supplied through plants’ root systems. If the problem is water 
quality, ecosystem services may create a cost-effective source 
of provision, as well. Recall that New York City water authorities 
determined that water quality could be achieved more cheaply 
through land management than through construction of a water 
treatment facility (see Box 4, page 14). 
Some services are easier to model than others. The relation-
ship between deforestation and erosion or biodiversity conserva-
tion, for example, is better understood than its effect on hydrology. 
At the outset, therefore, PES designers need to explicitly challenge 
their assumptions about service provision. It is hard to think of 
a worse outcome for a PES than supporters making unfounded 
claims that payments for land management will result in particular 
levels of service provision. 
Similarly, PES designers need to be clear at the outset about 
trade-offs. Land management practices to maximize one type of ser-
vice may result in reduction of another service. A classic example in 
this regard is the relationship between afforestation and water levels. 
Plantations of fast-growing trees such as eucalyptus may increase 
carbon sequestration, but they can also harm biodiversity, lower 
water availability, and reduce streamflows because of evapotranspi-
ration and a lower water table (Jackson et al. 2005). The provision of 
some services can also increase others; the maintenance of natural 
areas can enhance both biodiversity and pollination services. 
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Who Provides the Service and Who Benefits?
A precondition for market exchange is willing buyers and 
sellers. The primary concern of service buyers is a perceived 
current or future threat to their service provision. This may seem 
obvious, but it is an important point. For example, unless water 
consumers recognize a real and impending threat to their sup-
ply of clean water (e.g., through increased development of the 
forested upper watershed), there is no reason to pay the upper 
watershed landowners to keep the forest intact. If the forest were 
not threatened by development, PES would seem nonsensical 
since the consumers would continue to receive the service of 
water provision with or without payments. They can simply con-
tinue to act as free riders, enjoying the benefits provided by the 
upper watershed owners. 
Another precondition for functioning markets is the presence 
of discrete providers and beneficiaries. Economists describe this 
as a problem of collective action. Unless a relatively small number 
of providers and beneficiaries can get together, transaction costs 
may become too high for contract formation. The public goods na-
ture of many services makes this a real concern. Biodiversity, for 
example, benefits agriculture through service of genetic diversity. 
We all gain from these benefits, yet there is no sufficiently discrete 
class of beneficiaries with whom landholders can negotiate, and 
the transaction costs of gathering enough beneficiaries together 
to negotiate for the service may be too high.
Thus it is no surprise that private purchasers of biodiversity’s 
benefits are hard to find. For the same reason, one can under-
stand why so many examples of PES are found in the area of 
water quality. Most water consumers are not only accustomed to 
paying for potable water but can be collectively represented in a 
transaction by a single public body such as a water utility or local 
government. Put simply, if a land use provides valuable ecosystem 
services but they are widely enjoyed by diffuse beneficiaries, it 
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is unlikely that a market for services will arise in the absence of 
government intervention. 
Potential Buyers
Depending on the ecosystem service, there are a wide range 
of potential buyers. These are briefly set out below.
Government bodies. When services are public goods or there 
are diffuse beneficiaries, it may be necessary for the government 
to step in and act on behalf of those benefiting from the services. 
The appropriate level of government depends on the scale of 
service provision. This might include government payments to 
landowners for the services of water quality (local government), 
flood control (regional government), or carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity conservation (national government).
Corporations. When services are provided to discrete 
beneficiaries, private PES buyers may be willing to pay providers 
to ensure continuous provision. A hydroelectric company may be 
willing to pay upper watershed landowners to keep their forests 
intact in order to maintain the service of erosion control (so the lake 
behind the dam does not silt up). Corporations may be motivated 
by market concerns. Pressure from environmentally conscious 
consumers, for example, may cause a company to source its 
products or raw materials from supplies that have been certified 
as sustainably harvested. They may pay for service provision 
because of pressure from shareholders or consumers demanding 
improved corporate social responsibility. A company engaged in 
land development may voluntarily offset its harm to local biodiversity 
by voluntarily restoring habitat elsewhere.
Consumers. A category of consumers may wish to direct 
its purchases toward companies and products that act in what 
they view as an environmentally responsible manner. Eco-labels 
and certification programs can provide information to guide the 
purchasing behavior of these “green consumers.” If enough 
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consumers wish to buy certified products, then suppliers and 
retailers will respond to this market demand. Hunters and anglers 
eager for access to land managed for game or to streams maintained 
for fishing may be willing to pay for this service as well.
Nonprofits.	Conservation groups and land trusts routinely pay 
landowners to conserve biodiversity as part of the groups’ central 
missions. Similarly, philanthropies may fund service providers to 
ensure continued provision of a PES believed to be worthy.
Potential sellers
When the current land use is more profitable than an alter-
native that provides greater services, a PES approach will be 
ineffective unless it can make up for the lost profits. It is at the 
margins, comparing the marginal gain or loss from shifting land 
uses, that PES operate.
One can usefully divide service providers into two broad 
categories. The first is sellers who are paid for changes. That is, 
payments are made to landowners willing to change their land 
use so that it provides greater services. For example, buyers 
interested in biodiversity conservation may pay landowners to 
remove invasive species from their property and put in fencing to 
keep out predators. Without these payments, land use changes 
may not occur.
The second category of sellers is paid for maintaining the 
status quo in a manner similar to insurance. It includes those 
who currently provide services. Thus, for example, in Costa Rica, 
Energia Global, a hydroelectric power company, has been paying 
landowners in the upper watershed to keep their lands forested, 
described in Box 6, page 23.
In simple terms, Energía Global is concerned with sedimen-
tation of the lake behind their hydroelectric dam. The service of 
sediment retention provided through forest conservation prevents 
the lake from filling up with silt. Hence the goal of these payments 
DESIgnIng PAYMEnTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES    23
Box 6: Energía global and Erosion Control
Energía Global, a private hydropower company located in the Sarapiqui 
watershed of Costa Rica, provides electricity for about 400,000 consumers. 
The company wanted to protect the watershed in order to increase the reli-
ability of streamflow throughout the year and to reduce sedimentation. Through 
FONAFIFO (a government institution established to bring together ecosystem 
service buyers and sellers), Energía Global pays owners of upstream private land 
to reforest their land, engage in sustainable forestry, or conserve forest cover. 
Landowners who have recently cleared their land or landowners planning to 
replace natural forest with plantations are not eligible for compensation. Energía 
Global pays US$18 per hectare to FONAFIFO, which then adds an additional 
US$30 per hectare. FONAFIFO makes cash payments to landowners who have 
signed contracts with Energía Global. Total payments of US$48 per hectare per 
year are related to the opportunity costs of reforestation or forest conservation, 
such as potential revenues from cattle ranching. A local non-governmental orga-
nization oversees the implementation of the conservation activities, carries out 
technical studies, and administers the scheme.
Source: Smith et al. (2006).
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is explicitly not to change the land use but, rather, to maintain 
current practices. The payments ensure the flow of services will 
continue into the future.
The same marginal analysis occurs as described above, ex-
cept in this case the comparison is between profitability from the 
current use versus profitability of future uses that would degrade 
service provision. Thus, for example, anglers are beneficiaries of 
a wetlands’ role as a nursery for immature fish. If the wetland’s 
owner were considering destroying the wetland for a housing de-
velopment, anglers might be willing to pay owners to maintain the 
wetland in its current state. Therefore, the buyers must be willing to 
pay at least the marginal profit of what the landowner would have 
received by the development (i.e., the lost opportunity cost).
In either case, whether changing current land uses or maintain-
ing them, PES will be most effective when the payments make land 
uses marginally more profitable than alternative land use activities. 
At the same time, it is important not to focus exclusively on marginal 
profits. A number of PES schemes have found that landowners may 
be willing to bear some of the costs for service provision themselves 
because, for example, they take pride in their property’s biodiver-
sity (Stoneham 2002). As with buyers, there is a range of sellers 
of ecosystem services, depending on the service.
Private Landowners. In many countries, most ecosystem 
services are provided by private lands. These are often agricultural 
lands, including crops, grazing, and silviculture. While one-to-
one exchanges between buyers and private landowners are 
possible, collective action problems are significant. There are high 
transaction costs to single negotiations, and gathering together 
enough sellers to achieve a significant level of service provision 
may be difficult. This is particularly challenging for small-scale 
and low-income landowners in many rural areas (particularly in 
developing countries) who face an information constraint and may 
lack clear legal title to the land.
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To overcome some of these problems, landowners may or-
ganize into a private association to negotiate with a single voice, 
better protect their interests, and increase the overall level of 
service provision for sale. Such collective organization also allows 
sellers to “bundle” different services together (Asquith 2006).
Public landowners. Public bodies control large amounts 
of land and may negotiate for service payments. Similarly, a 
community group may sell services from communally held land 
or from land where community members have specific property 
rights such as grazing or cropping.
Mitigation providers. In countries with offset requirements 
for development, private parties may create mitigation banks and 
sell “credits.” This happens in the United States with wetlands 
mitigation and in some states with endangered species habitat.
Certification	organizations.	 It is worth noting that those 
who are directly paid may not be the provider of services. In 
certification systems, for example, the certifying body is often 
paid a licensing fee by the supplier for use of its eco-label. The 
certification indicates that the seller is operating in a sustainable 
manner (e.g., shade-grown coffee) and this, in turn, signals to 
consumers that they should buy this product rather than others 
that are lacking the label.
Perverse Incentives
Turning back to the watershed example in Box 1, page 10, re-
call that farmers graze cows on their fields beside the stream that 
flows into the drinking water reservoir. The farmers could manage 
their land to provide an improved service of water purification by 
planting riparian vegetation buffers. Such vegetative buffers capture 
nutrients and reduce silt before they reach the watercourse. Water 
consumers downstream benefit from these actions when drinking 
clean water that does not require extensive pre-treatment. The PES 
creates an incentive for farmers to put in riparian fencing because 
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they can now capture the benefits of the water purification services 
provided to downstream water drinkers. 
If one enquires more closely, though, paying for these services 
suggests a number of tensions. To start with, those farmers who 
have already put in riparian fencing no longer have a significant po-
tential for increased service provision and, as a result, are unlikely 
to be paid. Should every landholder who provides environmental 
services be paid? Given a finite budget, the answer to this would 
seemingly have to be “no.” It is hard to imagine a practical scheme, 
for example, that pays everyone whose vegetation reduces nutri-
ent flow in the watershed. If one seeks to pay for discrete cases 
of ecosystem service provision, clearly some land uses are more 
important than others. But how should one decide who gets paid 
and who does not?
To frame this dilemma more generally, consider which land-
holders should be supported by ecosystem service payments—
those who currently provide services or those whose properties 
pose the greatest nutrient or sediment problems (and hence the 
greatest potential for increased service provision)? If we say 
people are being paid to provide a service, then how can PES 
ignore those who already provide it? Is it not essentially paying 
off the bad actors and thereby encouraging undesirable behav-
ior? More generally, how do PES schemes equitably account for 
the baseline that is already out there? Those farmers who have 
already made the investments and managed their land responsi-
bly may not receive any payments. If only those who have been 
less responsible will benefit, the argument goes, this creates a 
disincentive to land stewardship. This decision will be a challenge 
for many service markets.
Other concerns have been raised over the problems of hold-
outs and free riders. These are most easily seen in the context 
of biodiversity conservation. The functional value of a reserve 
design or wildlife corridor depends critically on contiguous par-
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cels. If successful, the benefits from the sum of connected land 
parcels managed for biodiversity conservation should be greater 
than its parts. This can be frustrated, though, by the actions of 
a very small number of landholders who can hold out for prices 
well above market rates. Without their participation, it may be 
impossible to create effective habitats. Moreover, neighbors of 
those who dedicate their lands to biodiversity conservation may 
choose not to conserve biodiversity on their own land but, instead, 
free ride on the wildlife amenities on adjacent land. Given these 
two obstacles to competitive markets, one can understand the 
calls for coercive instruments. This is conceptually similar to the 
challenge in controversial Supreme Court cases such as Kelo v. 
City of New London, where the city imposed eminent domain on 
holdouts to urban development. PES can help avoid pressure for 
such regulatory controls on property.
What Level of Service Is needed?
So far this essay has identified the service to be provided, 
how it is provided, and who the providers and beneficiaries are, 
but what about the level of service provision? At the end of the 
day, the two most important aspects of any transaction are what 
you are paying for and how much you pay. In a PES program, we 
need more precision than simply identifying potential polluters 
and service providers. We need to know not only whom to pay, 
but also how much to pay them.
It is not enough to know that riparian fencing throughout a 
watershed is a good thing because it will improve water quality. 
Given the reality of limited resources, the key question becomes 
which riparian stretches need to be fenced off to provide the 
greatest level of water purification. In other words, given the many 
potential service providers, PES programs need to determine 
whom to pay and, equally, whom not to pay. This can raise a 
number of challenging issues.
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Landscape context matters. For most services, provision is 
heterogeneous. Certain properties provide greater service levels 
than others because of where they are located. A farm bordering 
a river will be more important in providing water purification than 
a distant farm. Determining the level of service requires identify-
ing the biophysical pathways of service provision. Consider, for 
example, the pilot program to combat salinity along the Macquarie 
River in Australia described in Box 7, page 29.
For a PES program to succeed over the long term, the buyers 
must be confident that the landscape management they pay for 
will, in fact, lead to either improved or continued service provi-
sion. This is fundamentally a scientific question, requiring a clear 
understanding of the biophysical pathway between landscape 
activity, service provision, and service delivery. The success of a 
PES scheme depends critically on the accuracy and cost of such 
assessments and, by extension, the creation of assessment meth-
odologies for use in the field. This underscores the importance of 
modeling and monitoring.
While an obvious assumption in PES schemes, it is worth 
emphasizing that the buyers need assurances that the payments 
they have made will, in fact, lead to the service provision they de-
sire. To gain this assurance requires both adequate modeling and 
monitoring. Effective modeling shows the biophysical pathway of 
a service provision, identifying metrics that should be monitored in 
order to assess service provision such as a farm’s proximity to a 
watercourse. Effective monitoring serves two purposes. First, it cre-
ates a baseline. One cannot determine if there has been a change 
in service provision unless a baseline exists. This is a fundamental 
issue in the “additionality” debate over the role of forests in carbon 
markets. Second, monitoring provides the data to assess compli-
ance and service provision once performance has begun.
Monitoring is easier in certain cases than others. PES 
schemes based on inputs are easier to monitor than those based 
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Box 7: Payments for Evapotranspiration
Underneath much of Australia the groundwater is saline, a remnant of the 
sea that used to sit atop the continent. Early settlers were often required to 
clear the native vegetation before they could claim title to the land. As a result, 
the ecosystem service of evapotranspiration that had served as a water pump 
to keep rainwater from reaching the groundwater was seriously weakened. 
Large expanses of agricultural areas now face salinity—saline groundwater ris-
ing to the root zone of plants and stunting their growth. One area that is feeling 
this effect is the Macquarie River valley.
In 1999, New South Wales State Forests signed a contract with Macquarie 
River Fruit and Fibre (MRFF), an organization that represents more than 600 
Macquarie Valley irrigation farmers, to purchase “salinity control credits.” Rather 
than mechanically pumping groundwater to keep the water table below the root 
zone of cash crops, MRFF purchased the ecosystem service of evapotranspira-
tion by paying grazers to plant 100 hectares of native forest in the upper Mac-
quarie River catchments, which should lead to a reduction in groundwater levels 
in the lower catchments. The project improved relations between the irrigation 
farmers (who had been making money) and the sheep farmers (who had not). 
This scheme could provide the extra income that would make timber production 
a profitable undertaking in traditional grazing areas and provide a steady income 
stream during lean crop years.
The challenge in the project has been uncertainty over the link between 
upstream revegetation efforts and downstream salinity reduction. The trees 
were planted in “salinity hot spots” and estimated to transpire 53.5 megalitres 
per hectare over 10 years. It was not known whether this change would lead to 
any reduction in salinity downstream or even how much land use change was 
needed for significant salinity changes. Given the poor understanding of how the 
service is provided and the time lags involved, MRFF chose not to expand the 
pilot project until it had more information.
Source: Salzman 2005 
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on outputs. If one is mandating or paying for specific land use 
practices or changes, such as in the MRFF scheme, compliance 
monitoring need only examine the land management change. The 
buyer simply visits the piece of land and checks if the fences have 
been properly constructed in the right place, for example, or the 
correct number of trees has been planted. Once one moves from 
services such as carbon sequestration, where relatively simple 
relationships can be estimated between ground vegetation and 
carbon sequestered, it becomes both more difficult and costly to 
measure actual provision from a specific landowner of such ser-
vices as water purification, pollination, or flood control. Equally, as 
the MRFF case study demonstrated, certain services are easier 
to model than others. As with other market transactions, PES 
works best when the rules are simple and compliance monitor-
ing mechanisms remain inexpensive. Yet this may result in less 
information than buyers want. In general, the more accurate the 
modeling and monitoring, the better buyers understand whether 
land use changes will improve service provision but, equally, the 
more expensive the transaction.
The net result is that it will be easier to develop markets for 
some services than for others for the simple reason that those 
buying services will be more confident that they are receiving 
value for their money. How difficult, for example, is linking the 
contributions of individual land management decisions to water 
quality in a water supplier’s subcatchment? The success of an 
ecosystem services approach for water quality depends on the 
accuracy and cost of such assessments and, by extension, the 
creation of assessment methodologies for use in the field.
What Is the Most Effective Payment Plan?
While it has become commonplace to speak of “PES mar-
kets,” in fact, few true markets for PES exist. With the exception 
of carbon credits, it is rarely the case that multiple buyers and 
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sellers exchange the same good on an open market. Rather, as 
described above, most PES schemes consist of a single buyer 
purchasing service provision from one or multiple sellers. 
While one can divide the types of PES mechanisms into 
many different categories, at a broad level there are three basic 
types—direct payment (general subsidy, scored subsidy, reverse 
auction, and negotiation), mitigation and offset payments (clean 
development mechanism, wetlands mitigation banking, and 
biodiversity offsets), and certification (eco-labels and forestry 
certification). Which mechanism is most appropriate will depend 
on a number of factors, including the type of service, the legal 
setting, whether the parties are public or private, the difficulty 
and cost of obtaining information, the availability of funds, the 
supporting institutions, etc.
Direct Payment
The simplest form of payment is a direct subsidy. Thus, for 
example, a government program concerned with soil erosion may 
provide funds for farmers to plant crops or till their lands in a manner 
that reduces erosion. This may be on a “first come-first served” basis, 
with the first applicants receiving funds until the money runs out. The 
major benefit of this approach is low information requirements and 
administrative costs. It may also allow for a period of experimentation 
to see what sorts of land management changes provide the most 
benefit. It may also satisfy political pressure to provide a subsidy to 
a particular land-owning interest group. General subsidies, however, 
may prove inefficient for they cannot meaningfully distinguish be-
tween those parties who can provide high-value services and those 
who may provide low-value services. So long as the land is located 
in a qualifying area and the owner commits to a particular land use 
practice, he or she is eligible for a payment.
Another common approach involves direct negotiation with 
providers by either public or private parties. This approach starts 
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with the assumption that different landholders can provide differ-
ent levels of service and should be compensated accordingly. The 
service beneficiary sits down with the service provider and strikes 
a deal. While the transaction costs can be higher than with other 
mechanisms, it may be preferable when there are few market par-
ticipants or there are significant uncertainties over service provision 
or willingness to accept.
Direct negotiation has the advantage of allowing individually 
crafted agreements but can be labor intensive if carried out with 
a large number of landholders. It also lacks the mechanism of 
farmers competing against one another to provide services and 
requires the purchaser to assess accurately the landholder’s 
willingness to accept.
Mitigation and Offset Payments
Mitigation and offset markets are based on regulations that 
prohibit certain behaviors. For this reason, they are sometimes 
called “compliance markets.” Regulations also create an exemp-
tion to its prohibition if the party can offset or mitigate its harm 
elsewhere. If a developer builds a road that destroys wetlands, 
for example, it must either create wetlands elsewhere to offset or 
mitigate its harms or, as is more often the case, purchase “cred-
its” from a third party who has already created wetlands for this 
purpose. The government plays a central role in setting the rules 
for these trades—what types of wetlands qualify, how many more 
acres of wetlands must be created than those destroyed, and 
how one measures the trade (hectares, wetlands function, etc.). 
Wetlands regulations in the United States, for example, are based 
on the premise of “no net loss.” If a hectare of wetlands is filled 
for development, then this harm must be mitigated by the creation 
of a hectare or more of wetlands somewhere else. Only when 
the mitigation requirements have been satisfied may a permit for 
wetlands development be issued. 
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A similar, though smaller, market exists for biodiversity offsets. In 
exchange for permission to develop in a species habitat, the devel-
oper must mitigate the harm by restoring species habitat elsewhere. 
As described below, some mitigation markets are voluntary, with 
companies choosing to restore habitat on their own. The challenge 
for such markets lies in comparability. Unlike a molecule of carbon 
dioxide, which is the same no matter where emitted or sequestered 
in the world, biodiversity is both heterogeneous and location specific, 
making trades difficult.
Offset markets operate in a similar manner with pollutants. In 
the context of climate change, some regulatory markets permit those 
emitting greenhouse gases to offset their emissions by purchasing 
credits for sequestered carbon. Because planting trees can remove 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, the market designers assume 
that a ton of sequestered carbon dioxide is equivalent to a ton of 
reduced carbon dioxide emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, 
created the Clean Development Mechanism. This provides for reduc-
tion credits from carbon sequestered by land management. Negotia-
tions are currently underway for the next climate treaty, and many 
believe that a similar offset provision, known as REDD (Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), will be in-
cluded in the final draft. In simple terms, REDD would pay countries 
for reducing emissions that would have occurred if deforestation 
had continued at its historic rates. REDD provides payments for 
improving the ecosystem service of carbon sequestration. Voluntary 
markets—carbon trades that operate outside the Kyoto framework 
and national laws—have also been on the rise, primarily driven by 
corporate social responsibility concerns (Hamilton et al. 2010).
Constructing smoothly functioning offset and mitigation mar-
kets is not simple. There must be a sufficient and well-defined 
marketplace as well as a community of market participants. There 
also must be a refined currency of trade, one that is fungible and 
reflects the desired environmental quality. For example, it would 
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be a stretch to consider allowing coastal developers in one state to 
“trade” wetland values they eliminate for reductions in phosphorous 
emissions in another state.
Certification
Growing in importance since the 1990s, certification schemes 
focus on the importance of consumption in degrading ecosystem 
services. As previously noted, a lack of information is a significant 
barrier to environmental protection. Consumers and corporations 
wishing to promote environmentally responsible practices through 
their purchasing behavior cannot do so unless they have information 
on the attributes of the products they wish to buy or the behavior 
of their suppliers. Certification and eco-labels attempt to provide 
this information. The premise of these programs is that a significant 
percentage of consumers and companies will prefer to purchase 
goods and services that are environmentally preferable if there is a 
reliable means of identifying them. This, in turn, will provide these 
goods and services a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
To address this information need, eco-labels and certification 
schemes have grown rapidly over the past two decades across 
a range of sectors, including sustainably harvested timber, cof-
fee, fisheries, agriculture, and even financial companies and 
eco-tourism. These certification initiatives’ goal is to provide 
consumers with an objective basis for selecting environmentally 
responsible products (see Box 8, page 35).
Are the Supporting Institutions Adequate?
Very few transactions take place in the absence of supporting 
institutions. Even the simplest contracts between buyers and sellers 
rely on institutions (formal or informal) to adjudicate disputes when 
they arise and on enforcement to ensure the judgments are carried 
out. A range of specialized institutions, both public and private, can 
promote PES transactions. Consider, for example, the role of institu-
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Box 8: Forest Stewardship Certification
Founded in 1993, the Forest Stewardship Certification (FSC) has created 
a mechanism to set standards, certify, and label forest products that have been 
managed in an environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable manner. 
FSC certification is voluntary. Forest owners who wish to use the FSC label in 
marketing their products must satisfy the relevant FSC standards developed for 
particular types of forests and conditions. Common principles include compli-
ance with laws, clear tenure and use rights, recognition and respect for indige-
nous rights to the forest, etc. Compliance is certified by an FSC-accredited body 
that audits and then approves individual forest management.
Because timber is a global market, chain of custody becomes important. It 
is necessary to ensure that FSC-certified timber can be tracked throughout the 
supply chain from harvest to point of sale. This is accomplished through Chain 
of Custody certification, a system that ensures controls are in place to track 
certified wood products throughout the supply chain. Importantly, FSC does 
not itself conduct any certification activities of forest management or the supply 
chain. These are conducted by accredited certification organizations (currently 
twelve around the globe). The forest product producers are responsible for the 
certification costs.
As of December 2008, roughly 107 million hectares of forest in 78 countries 
were FSC-certified. Approximately 12,000 FSC Chain of Custody certificates 
have been issued in 81 countries. 
Source: Forest Stewardship Council (2009).
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tions in the case of payments for carbon sequestration. To facilitate 
exchange of carbon sequestration credits, the Australian state of 
New South Wales has statutorily created an alienable property right 
in sequestered carbon. Thus, a forest landowner can sell credits for 
carbon stored in his or her trees, and this can then be sold again by 
third parties. Carbon registries have been created, as well, to record 
obligations and credits. In the United States, the Chicago Climate 
Exchange provides a marketplace for buyers and sellers of carbon 
credits to exchange with one another. A number of countries have 
created the equivalent of a national carbon office that keeps track 
of carbon emissions and reduction projects, and private certifica-
tion organizations now provide the service of certifying that carbon 
sequestration projects accurately report on their activities.
There are many different types of institutions that can sup-
port PES and, importantly, these need not be formal government 
bodies. Indeed, in many parts of the world formal institutions are 
ineffective, and parties cannot assume that laws will be complied 
with or enforced. In such cases, informal local institutions, based 
on customary practices, can provide the support needed for PES 
schemes to operate.
Because payment is generally premised on specific land use 
activities, a basic obligation of the provider is to demonstrate suf-
ficient ownership or control of the land to ensure service provision. 
The buyers need to know whom to pay and have some assurance 
that the seller can undertake the land management or service 
provision to which they have agreed. In broad terms, this is an 
issue of property rights. Unless property rights are well defined 
and protected, people have limited ability and incentive to care 
for property over time. Compared to most countries, the United 
States has strong institutions that provide relatively secure legal 
rights to property owners. It is a common value for people to want 
to leave the land for the next generation in better condition than 
when received. As wealth has increased, property values have 
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risen, which, in turn, may now increase efforts to restore land and 
waterways to quality conditions.
There are many different types of property rights. These include 
the right to occupy, the right to use, the right to derive income, the right 
to sell, and the right to exclude, among others. Obviously, depending 
on the circumstances, some of these rights will be more important for 
service provision than others. In an ideal situation, the provider would 
hold all of these property rights and could easily prove ownership of 
the land. This is often the case in developed countries. In much of 
the world, however, this can prove a major challenge.
Supporting institutions are particularly important in the context 
of property rights. In a developed system, owners need a land 
registry where they can record their title and where buyers can 
search titles. There also must be adequate contract law and legal 
institutions to adjudicate disputes as well as adequate authorities 
to enforce judgments. These supporting institutions, however, 
are not always present, particularly in parts of some developing 
countries. This does not, however, mean that PES schemes cannot 
successfully operate there.
Because clear title is not always available and the cost of es-
tablishing clear title may not be justified by the size of the service 
payments, PES must often consider both de jure and de facto legal 
title. De jure title describes the legally recognized ownership status; 
de facto describes the actual practice on the ground. Individuals 
or communities may effectively control land so that service provi-
sion can be ensured even though they may not have clear legal 
title. Those on the land may even be squatters. In such a case, 
de facto status may be more important than de jure status. This is 
particularly significant when supporting institutions such as gov-
ernment monitoring and enforcement are weak. Indeed, in some 
cases service payments are particularly attractive because they 
are seen as a way to legitimize unclear land title by giving the land 
manager greater credibility (Greiber 2009).
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Payments for ecosystem services represent a promising 
development not only in terms of conservation mechanisms but, 
more generally, in how we think about conservation. By identify-
ing the critical role that landscape management plays in providing 
valued services, PES frames environmental protection explicitly as 
a matter of private ordering between suppliers and beneficiaries. 
In some cases, this can provide an attractive and more effec-
tive alternative to traditional regulations. This arrangement also 
encourages landowners to view their property in a different way. 
PES can identify new streams of income that may not have been 
recognized or optimized before, creating incentives for landowners 
to manage their properties specifically for the provision of clean 
water, biodiversity, or other amenities.
This arrangement, of course, is not a silver bullet. This Policy 
Series has identified the necessary preconditions for successful 
PES. Absent perceived scarcity of the service, discrete buyers and 
sellers, secure property rights, and other conditions, it is unlikely 
that PES will emerge. That being said, PES represents a promising 
development of voluntary exchanges through markets that enhance 
environmental asset development. As we learn more about the 
values of the complex resources provided by an ecosystem, we 
become more willing to invest in husbanding those resources.
notE
1.  PES refers to voluntary transactions where a service provider is paid 
by or on behalf of service beneficiaries for land, coastal, or marine 
management practices that are expected to result in continued or 
improved service provision. Sven Wunder (2005) defines PES as 
having five attributes: (1) a voluntary transaction where (2) a well-
defined ES—or a land-use likely to secure that service (3) is being 
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“bought” by an ES buyer (4) from an ES provider (5) if, and only if, 
the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality).
The shortcoming of this definition is that only a small percentage 
of PES schemes satisfy condition five. Most PES are based on 
inputs (i.e., land management practices) rather than outputs (i.e., a 
measurable change in service provision), whether this increases the 
service provision or not.
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